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Abstract
We consider the problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences represented by
arbitrary binary relations or incomplete paired comparison matrices. For a number
of indirect scoring procedures we examine whether or not they satisfy the axiom
of self-consistent monotonicity. The class of win-loss combining scoring procedures
is introduced which contains a majority of known scoring procedures. Two main
results are established. According to the first one, every win-loss combining scoring
procedure breaks self-consistent monotonicity. The second result provides a suffi-
cient condition of satisfying self-consistent monotonicity.
1 Introduction
A good method of preference fusion when there are only two alternatives is
the simple majority of judge votes. This has been shown by Condorcet in his
famous jury theorem [1]; for a review of further developments see [2,3].
The situation becomes much more complicated when the number of alterna-
tives exceeds two. In this case, the majority of judge preferences may turn out
to be intransitive and contain preference cycles. Some statistical approaches
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to this problem are developed in the theory of paired comparisons (see [4])
and ranking data (see [5]).
In this paper, we use a normative approach typical of the social choice the-
ory and consider indirect scoring procedures as the methods of preference
fusion. These ingenious procedures are mainly developed in such disciplines
as applied statistics, scoring of sport tournaments, graph theory, management
science, etc. Indirect score of an alternative reflects not only the outcomes of
its comparisons with other alternatives, but also the comparison outcomes of
those alternatives to which this one has been compared, and this way it may
depend on all the available preference data. Still there are very few papers on
indirect scoring procedures in the social choice theory. Probably, the reason
is that these procedures are not arithmetically ascetic enough, and thereby,
according to a widespread opinion, do not correspond to the non-quantitative
nature of the social choice problem. Another problem is that they are not easy
to describe to the individuals involved in the choice process. However, com-
plexity may be considered to be an advantage in the context of the strategic
behavior: complicated procedures are more difficult to manipulate.
Nevertheless, there is a case where the indirect scoring procedures are really
needed, namely, the case of incomplete preferences. In this paper, we attempt
to demonstrate this case, give a brief critical review of indirect scoring proce-
dures, and compare their properties.
Let us consider the situation where an individual is given a set of alternatives
to be compared, but he/she is not an expert in all of them. Suppose she is
allowed to compare only those alternatives she is familiar with; moreover, to
report only those comparison outcomes she is certain of. In fact, we consider
even more general types of individual opinions, namely, each of them is an
arbitrary binary relation. To prepare these data for calculating indirect scores,
we represent them by incomplete matrices of paired comparisons borrowed
from the statistical theory of paired comparisons.
The main aim of this paper is to examine whether or not the indirect scoring
procedures satisfy the axiom of Self-Consistent Monotonicity (SCM). It has
been introduced in [6] where we used it to explore a series of preference aggre-
gation procedures based on the resolution of discrete optimization problems.
Up to now there has not been a comprehensive review of indirect scoring
procedures. However, a lot of information can be found in monographs [4,7–
10] and papers [11–16]. For relations to the social choice framework see [17].
An adjacent subject is the analysis of tournament social choice rules (see, e.g.,
[18,19]).
The paper is organized as follows. After the following section which provides
main notation, in Section 3 we give an example demonstrating the specific
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character of aggregating incomplete preferences. Section 4 contains the state-
ment and justification of SCM. Section 5 demonstrates that if a procedure is
based on individual scores , it break SCM. Sections 6, 8 and 10 give a review
of indirect scoring procedures known from the literature. Section 7 introduces
the class of win-loss combining scoring procedures and establishes that these
procedures fail to satisfy SCM. Section 9 provides a sufficient condition for
SCM, and Section 11 discusses two other axioms.
2 Notation
Suppose J = {1, . . . , n} is a set of alternatives to be compared. There are m
individuals (judges, voters, etc.), and each of them reports his/her preferences.
Concerning any pair (i, j) of alternatives, an individual may give one of the
following four responses: (a) “i is better than j”, (b) “j is better than i”, (c) “i
and j are equivalent”, and (d) “I do not report my opinion on this pair.” Using
the responses of the pth individual, an incomplete paired comparison matrix
A(p) = [apij ] is filled out. Its entries a
p
ij and a
p
ji correspond to the comparison
outcome of i and j as follows:
if the pth individual said that
– i is better than j, then apij = 1, a
p
ji = 0;
– i and j are equivalent, then apij = a
p
ji = 1/2;
If the individual did not report his/her opinion, apij and a
p
ji remain undefined.
By definition, we set all diagonal entries to be zero: apii = 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
p = 1, . . . , m. Some authors put apii = 1/2 or leave a
p
ii undefined, but this does
not change the results significantly.
This way we have an array of incomplete paired comparison matrices A =
(A(1), . . . , A(m)) which is referred to as a profile of individual preferences. A
scoring (rating) procedure is a function S from the set of all profiles (or its
subset) into Rn, where si, the ith component of the resulting column vector
s = (s1, . . . , sn)
⊤ is interpreted as a score of the alternative i. All the scoring
procedures considered in this paper are assumed to be neutral (any reindexing
of the alternatives preserves their scores) and anonymous (any reindexing of
the individuals preserves the scores of the alternatives). The term “aggregation
of incomplete preferences” will mean here nothing but rating the alternatives
by the scores s1, . . . , sn: the greater is a score, the more socially preferred is
the alternative.
3
3 An Example
The problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences has a specific flavor
which cannot be revealed in dealing with complete preferences. To capture it
consider the following example.
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Fig. 1. a, b, c: Preferences of nine individuals; d: Combined preferences.
Suppose there are four alternatives, J = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and nine individuals
(judges). Three judges are familiar with alternatives 1 and 2 and they all
feel that 1 is better (Fig. 1.a where an arrow from 1 to 2 shows that 1 is
preferred to 2). Three judges think that 1 and 3 are equivalent (Fig. 1.b where
line segments without arrows designate equivalencies). Finally, three judges
are familiar with 2 and 4, and they all consider these alternatives of equal
quality (Fig. 1.c). The preferences of these nine individuals are incorporated
in Fig. 1.d. Can we say anything about the comparative quality of 3 and 4?
Although no judge is familiar with 3 and 4 simultaneously, it is plausible that
3 is better than 4. Note that 3 and 4 have the same comparison outcomes:
three equivalencies; they differ only in the alternatives to which they were
compared. The “opponent” of 3 is probably better than that of 4 and due to
this 3 may be estimated higher than 4.
Thus, in aggregating incomplete preferences we should take into account “qual-
ity (strength) of the opponents” or “caliber of the opposition” or “schedule
difficulty”. These terms came from sport, and we see that there is a similarity
between the problem of aggregation of incomplete preferences and the prob-
lem of rating the participants of an incomplete tournament (note that the
extent of this similarity is a distinct and interesting question). Moreover, in
the following section this sport analogy will be exploited to explain the mean-
ing of Self-Consistent Monotonicity, the axiom which is discussed throughout
the paper. Sometimes the comparison outcome where i is preferred to j will
be called a “win” of i and a “loss” of j.
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4 Self-Consistent Monotonicity
First, let us consider one more example. Suppose we have the incomplete sport
tournament whose fragment containing all game results of i and j is shown
in Fig. 2. Suppose we know that a is stronger than b, c is stronger than d,
and e is stronger than f . Then the results of i are definitely better than those
of j. Indeed, a loss to a is more pardonable than that to b, a win over c is
more honorable than that over d, and a win over e is more valuable than a
draw with f . Besides, i has three extra wins and j has two extra losses, which
intensify the advantage of i over j.
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Fig. 2. An illustration to self-consistent monotonicity.
In fact, the following self-consistent monotonicity axiom requires that in such
situations the score of i should be greater than the score of j. The only point is
the meaning of preconceptions like “we know that a is stronger than b”. Self-
consistent monotonicity applies to scoring procedures, and here “we know
that a is stronger than b” signifies “this scoring procedure gives a a greater
score than b.” This makes clear why this kind of monotonicity is called “self-
consistent”.
In the following statement of self-consistent monotonicity, we use the term
“multiset”. Its difference from set is that multiset may contain the same el-
ement in several copies. This concept is needed here since the outcomes of
comparisons with different alternatives may coincide. The elements of multi-
sets will be written within angle brackets.
Self-consistent monotonicity (SCM). A scoring procedure S is Self-
Consistently Monotonic if for any set of alternatives J , any profile A, and
any alternatives i, j ∈ J it satisfies the following condition.
Suppose Ui = 〈a
p
ik | k, p〉 and Uj = 〈a
q
jℓ | ℓ, q〉 are the multisets of the compari-
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son outcomes of alternatives i and j, respectively. Suppose that Ui can be split
into U Ii and U
II
i , and Uj can be split into U
I
j and U
II
j in such a way that
(i) apik ∈ U
I
i implies a
p
ik = 1, a
q
jℓ ∈ U
I
j implies a
q
jℓ = 0;
(ii) there exists a one-to-one correspondence π of U IIi onto U
II
j such that
π(apik) = a
q
jℓ implies a
p
ik ≥ a
q
jℓ and sk ≥ sℓ.
Then si ≥ sj.
Moreover, if in addition U Ii is nonempty or U
I
j is nonempty or at least one
inequality in (ii) is strict at least once, then si > sj.
The application of SCM to a pair of alternatives (i, j) will be called confronta-
tion of i and j.
It turns out that many well-known indirect scoring procedures fail to satisfy
self-consistent monotonicity. In the following two sections we try to explore
the features of these procedures that cause them not to satisfy SCM. The
results are presented in Proposition 1 (Section 5) and Theorem 8 (Section 7).
Section 9 provides a sufficient condition of SCM (Theorem 12).
5 Procedures Based on Individual Scores
A scoring procedure S is based on individual scores if there exist functions
f and δ such that for any profile A = (A(1), . . . , A(m)), the corresponding
score vector s can be expressed as s = δ(s(1), . . . , s(m)), where s(p) is a partial
score vector depending solely on the comparison matrix of individual p: s(p) =
f(A(p)), p = 1, . . . , m.
The most important instance is
s =
m∑
p=1
s(p),
forming (in case of complete preferences) a class of procedures which satisfy
the recent axiomatics by Myerson [20].
Proposition 1 There are scoring procedures based on individual scores that
satisfy SCM on complete preferences but no such procedure satisfies SCM for
incomplete preferences.
PROOF. To prove the first statement, it suffices to consider the row sum
procedure, which in case of complete preferences has the form
6
s
(p)
i =
n∑
j=1
apij , i = 1, . . . , n, p = 1, . . . , m,
s=
m∑
p=1
s(p) .
This procedure obviously satisfies SCM.
The second statement can be proved by considering our first example of Fig. 1.
Let p = 1, 2, 3 be the numbers of individuals in Fig. 1.a, p = 4, 5, 6 in Fig. 1.b,
and p = 7, 8, 9 in Fig. 1.c. By neutrality and anonymity of S,
s
(1)
3 = s
(2)
3 = s
(3)
3 = s
(1)
4 = s
(2)
4 = s
(3)
4 ,
s
(4)
3 = s
(5)
3 = s
(6)
3 = s
(7)
4 = s
(8)
4 = s
(9)
4 ,
s
(4)
4 = s
(5)
4 = s
(6)
4 = s
(7)
3 = s
(8)
3 = s
(9)
3 .
Hence, s3 =
9∑
p=1
s
(p)
3 =
9∑
p=1
s
(p)
4 = s4 .
Confronting 3 and 4 by SCM (see Fig. 1.d), we deduce s1 = s2 . But now,
confronting 1 and 2, we get contradiction. ✷
In words, these procedures generally break SCM because the result of con-
frontation between two alternatives may be only determined by the preferences
of the whole board of judges.
6 Aggregate Scoring Procedures
Hereafter we will consider scoring procedures that cannot be reduced to in-
dividual scores. Such indivisible procedures can be called aggregate. A large
variety of them are representable through the matrix A = [aij ] of total com-
parison outcomes on the pairs of alternatives:
aij =


0, if apij is undefined for every p,∑
p
apij , otherwise.
(1)
Consider the scores of the form:
si =
n∑
j=1
f(aij, xj), i = 1, . . . , n, (2)
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where xj (j = 1, . . . , n) is some estimate of the alternative j, f is a function
nondecreasing in both aij and xj . Sometimes averaged scores of the form
si =
1
mi
n∑
j=1
f(aij, xj), i = 1, . . . , n (3)
are proposed, where mi is the total number of comparisons of i (see, e.g., [16]).
For simplicity, we do not consider this modification here, however, it is covered
by Theorem 8 below.
6.1 Wei’s Procedure
The most popular form of f in Eqs (2) is the product:
si =
n∑
j=1
aij xj , i = 1, . . . , n. (4)
Regarding the choice of the form of xj , perhaps the most attractive idea is
to relate xj and sj directly. However, if we set xj = sj, j = 1, . . . , n, the
homogeneous system of linear equations (4) may have only a trivial solution
s1 = · · · = sn = 0. A minor modification is to define xj to be proportional to
sj :
xj = sj /λ, j = 1, . . . , n,
not specifying λ a priori. Then
λsi =
n∑
j=1
aij sj, i = 1, . . . , n, (5)
or in the matrix form,
λ s = A s, (6)
thus λ is an eigenvalue and s an eigenvector of A.
This scoring procedure was proposed by Wei [21] and became well-known
after Kendall’s [22] paper. Matrix A generally has several eigenvalues, each
having its own subspace of eigenvectors. Only one solution is taken, and this
solution possesses special properties. Let us suppose that the preferences are
indivisible, i.e., the set of alternatives J cannot be split into two nonempty
parts J1 and J2 such that for no alternatives j ∈ J2 and i ∈ J1, aji > 0. Then,
by the Perron–Frobenius theorem, the largest in absolute value eigenvalue of
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A is positive, the corresponding subspace of eigenvectors is one-dimensional,
and these eigenvectors have the same sign of all terms. Just the normalized
positive eigenvector s of this type is taken as a vector of scores in the Wei
procedure (which applies to indivisible preferences).
Wei’s eigenvector can be obtained iteratively. Consider the following sequence
of score vectors:
s1=A 1, where 1 = (1, . . . , 1)⊤;
s2=A s1 = A2 1;
· · · · · ·
sk =A sk−1 = Ak 1;
· · · · · ·
It follows from the Perron–Frobenius theorem that in case of indivisible pro-
files, the normalized sequence (sk) converges to Wei’s score vector:
sk
n∑
i=1
ski
=
1
n∑
i=1
ski
Ak 1 −→
k→∞
s . (7)
It is a simple fact that ski is the number of k-length paths from i to all ver-
tices in the preference multidigraph. Thus, in Wei’s procedure, alternatives
are compared by the number of very long (“infinitely-long”) paths diverging
from them in the preference multidigraph. In Subsection 6.3 we shall consider
a scoring procedure where longer paths are accounted with smaller weights.
Proposition 2 If indivisible preferences are complete, Wei’s scoring proce-
dure satisfies SCM, but it breaks SCM for incomplete indivisible preferences.
PROOF. To prove the first statement, confront arbitrary i and j by SCM:
si =
1
λ
n∑
k=1
aik sk, (8)
sj =
1
λ
n∑
k=1
ajk sk, (9)
and assume that some partitions of Ui and Uj described in self-consistent
monotonicity exist. Then U IIi induces on the right-hand side of Eq. (8) a no
lesser (respectively, greater in the strict case) sum of terms than U IIj induces on
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the right-hand side of Eq. (9). The same can be said of U Ii and U
I
j . Therefore,
si ≥ sj (si > sj in the strict case).
To prove the second statement, consider the cumulative preference digraph
depicted in Fig. 3.
1
3
4
2
5
❆
❆❯
❆
❆❯
✡
✡
✡✡✢
✬
✫
✩
✪
Fig. 3. Preferences in the proof of Proposition 2.
The comparison outcomes of alternative 5 are equivalencies with alternatives 1,
2, 3 and 4. Alternative 5 is introduced only to make the preferences indivisible.
Consider the equations with s2 and s3 on the left-hand sides:
λs2= s4+s5 /2,
λs3= s4+s5 /2.
Hence, s2 = s3, which contradicts SCM, since 3 has an extra “loss” (a31 =
0, a13 = 1). ✷
The example used in the proof of Proposition 2 reveals one important fea-
ture of Wei’s procedure as applied to incomplete preferences. Namely, this
procedure bases itself only on “wins” and does not take into account “losses”.
More precisely, it does not distinguish “losses” from missing comparisons (and
precisely this contradicts SCM). A possible way to make the procedure more
balanced is to also consider a dual procedure which is based on “losses”, and
then to combine the resulting scores. This has been done by Hasse [23] and
Ramanujacharyulu [24].
6.2 The Procedures by Hasse and Ramanujacharyulu
Let w and l denote the right and left eigenvectors of matrix A, corresponding
to its maximal eigenvalue λ :
λwi =
n∑
j=1
aij wj, i = 1, . . . , n, (10)
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λℓi =
n∑
j=1
aji ℓj, i = 1, . . . , n, (11)
Here w = (w1, . . . , wn) is the vector of Wei’s win-scores, which is not sensitive
to the distinction between “losses” and missing comparisons; l = (ℓ1, . . . , ℓn)
is the vector of loss-scores, which does not distinguish “wins” and missing
comparisons. The matrix form of Eqs (11) is
λ l = B l, (12)
where B = A⊤ is the transpose of A.
Hasse [23] proposed to combine w and l into the ultimate scores:
si = wi−ℓi, i = 1, . . . , n. (13)
Another procedure proposed by Ramanujacharyulu [24] has scores given by:
si = wi /ℓi, i = 1, . . . , n. (14)
These two procedures are close but may produce different rankings, since the
first one registers the absolute differences between win-scores and loss-scores,
whereas the second is based on the relative differences. Both procedures are ap-
plicable to indivisible preferences and turn out to break self-consistent mono-
tonicity. We do not formulate the corresponding statement, because there are
many possible modifications of such procedures, and a more reasonable thing
to do is to isolate their common features and then to prove a more general
theorem. To this end, in the following two subsections we consider two other
families of indirect scoring procedures, and then proceed with a theorem.
6.3 The Procedure of Katz–Thompson–Taylor
As we have seen, Wei’s scores rank order the alternatives according to the
number of very long paths diverging from them in the preference multidi-
graph. Katz [25] and then Thompson [26] and Taylor [27] proposed a scoring
procedure in which the long paths play just a correcting role, whereas the
short paths are taken into account with greater weights. Namely, Thompson
introduced the scores of the form
w = (A+ εA2 + ε2A3 + · · ·) 1, (15)
11
where ε is a small positive parameter. If ε < r−1 where r is the spectral radius
of A, then the series (15), which in fact is a geometric progression, converges
and
w = A(I − εA)−1 1, (16)
where I is the identity matrix.
Thompson shows that his normalized vector w tends to Wei’s eigenvector as ε
approaches r−1 from below. Besides, he gives a game-theoretical interpretation
of these scores comparable with the approach by Laffond, Laslier and Lebreton
[28].
The paper by Taylor is one of the few social choice articles devoted to indirect
scoring procedures. He investigated sequential voting by the committee and
considered Hamiltonian sequences of winning alternatives, which led him to
a scoring procedure very close to (15). In fact, Taylor used another matrix
C = [cij ] instead A, where
cij =
{
aij −aji, if aij −aji ≥ 0,
0, otherwise.
Since for the preference structure we use in the proof of Theorem 8 in Section 7,
A and C coincide, the statement of this theorem is valid for Taylor’s procedure.
As above, w in Eqs (15) and (16) is a vector of win-scores, and it is worth
being supplemented by the corresponding loss-scores. So we may consider a
pair of vectors (w, l) where
l = (B + εB
2 + ε2B3 + · · ·) 1, (17)
and combine w and l as in the procedures of Hasse and Ramanujacharyulu:
si = wi−ℓi, i = 1, . . . , n
or
si = wi /ℓi, i = 1, . . . , n.
The question we are interested in is whether or not these procedures satisfy
self-consistent monotonicity. The answer is negative. After considering one
more family of scoring procedures, we give a theorem that will clarify this
point to some extent.
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6.4 Directed Tree Procedure by Daniels–Ushakov–Goddard–Levchenkov
Let c+i and c
−
i be the total “win” and total “loss” of i, respectively:
c+i =
n∑
j=1
aij ,
c−i =
n∑
j=1
aji, i = 1, . . . , n. (18)
Daniels [11] and other writers [29–33] proposed, with various motivations, the
scores w1, . . . , wn that satisfy
wi =
1
c−i
n∑
j=1
aij wj, i = 1, . . . , n. (19)
The only difference of this system of equation from that of Wei is that λ is
replaced by c−i . This is possible because the matrix [aij /c
−
i ] always has a unit
eigenvalue. Scores wi have several interesting interpretations listed below.
(i) wi is proportional to the number of directed trees diverging from i in the
preference multidigraph [34];
(ii) wi are proportional to the final probabilities of the “winning Markov chain”
[29,30,35,32,33,36];
(iii) w is the vector of “fair bets” in the model of Moon and Pullman [12].
Also, in [37–39] this procedure is analyzed in the social choice framework, and
in [40,41] its strategic properties are touched upon.
Exactly as before, we may consider the corresponding loss-scores mentioned
by Daley [35]:
ℓi =
1
c+i
n∑
j=1
aji ℓj , i = 1, . . . , n (20)
and define the ultimate score vector as a combination of w and l, e.g.,
si = wi−ℓi, i = 1, . . . , n
or
si = wi /ℓi, i = 1, . . . , n.
The procedures of this family break SCM, and now we are in a position to
specify a more general class of indirect scoring procedures that do not obey
SCM. All the above procedures are included.
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7 A General Class of Procedures That Fail to Satisfy Self-Consis-
tent Monotonicity
In this section we define win-loss indices and win-loss combining procedures
and prove that such procedures break self-consistent monotonicity.
In the following Definitions 3–5, profile A is fixed; “vector” means n-
component column vector.
Definition 3 (recursive). Win-loss index of finite order.
1◦. A pair of vectors (w, l) is a win-loss index of zero order if w = l =
(1, . . . , 1)⊤.
2◦. A pair of vectors (w, l) is a win-loss index of order k if there exists a win-loss
index (w′, l′) of order k − 1 and functions f , g, α and β such that
wi=
1
α(c+i , c
−
i )
f(W ′i ),
ℓi=
1
β(c−i , c
+
i )
g(L′i), i = 1, . . . , n, (21)
where W ′i = 〈(ai1, w
′
1), (ai2, w
′
2), . . . , (ain, w
′
n)〉, L
′
i = 〈(a1i, ℓ
′
1), (a2i, ℓ
′
2),
. . . , (ani, ℓ
′
n)〉, i = 1, . . . , n; angle brackets designate multisets.
W ′i and L
′
i are respectively called the win-performance and the loss-perfor-
mance of i corresponding to (w′, l′).
One can see that in the Directed tree procedure of Subsection 6.4, α(c+i , c
−
i ) is
c−i ; β(c
−
i , c
+
i ) is c
+
i ; f and g are sums of products. An essential difference is that
in the Directed tree procedure, wi and ℓi are related with the win-performance
and loss-performance corresponding to the same pair of vectors (w, l), not to
a win-loss index of the previous order. Thus, Eqs (19) and (20) do not fit
Definition 3. That pair of vectors (w, l) satisfies the following definition.
Definition 4 Win-loss index of infinite order. A pair of vectors (w, l) =
((w1, . . . , wn)
⊤, (ℓ1, . . . , ℓn)
⊤) is a win-loss index of infinite order if there exist
functions f , g, α and β such that
wi=
1
α(c+i , c
−
i )
f(Wi),
ℓi=
1
β(c−i , c
+
i )
g(Li), i = 1, . . . , n, (22)
where Wi = 〈(ai1, w1), (ai2, w2), . . . , (ain, wn)〉 and Li = 〈(a1i, ℓ1), (a2i, ℓ2), . . . ,
(ani, ℓn)〉, i = 1, . . . , n.
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The following definition introduces win-loss indices without order.
Definition 5 Win-loss index. A pair of vectors (w, l) = ((w1, . . . , wn)
⊤,
(ℓ1, . . . , ℓn)
⊤) is a win-loss index if there exists a sequence ((w1, ℓ1), (w2, ℓ2), ...)
of win-loss indices of finite or infinite order and functions ϕ and ψ such that
for i = 1, . . . , n,
wi=ϕ(w
1
i , ℓ
1
i , w
2
i , ℓ
2
i , . . .),
ℓi=ψ(w
1
i , ℓ
1
i , w
2
i , ℓ
2
i , . . .). (23)
The components of w and l are referred to as win-scores and loss-scores,
respectively (note that they depend on both w-components and ℓ-components
of the sequence elements). The next (and last) definition introduces a scoring
procedure that combines win-scores and loss-scores of a win-loss index.
Definition 6 Win-loss combining scoring procedure. Scoring procedure S is
a win-loss combining scoring procedure if for any profile A there exists a win-
loss index (w, l) and a function h such that
si = h(wi, ℓi), i = 1, . . . , n.
Proposition 7 All scoring procedures that generate score vectors of Section 6
or any their iterative approximations constructed as in 2◦ of Definition 3, are
win-loss combining scoring procedures.
The proof of Proposition 7 is straightforward. Among other win-loss combin-
ing scoring procedures, let us mention the elaborate procedure by David (see
[42,4,15], and procedures by Cowden [43] and Ginovker [44]. The latter two
authors also proposed other procedures which will be mentioned below. An
interesting discussion of related topics can be found in [16].
Theorem 8 Every win-loss combining scoring procedure defined on the set of
indivisible preference profiles breaks self-consistent monotonicity.
PROOF. Assume that there exists a win-loss combining scoring procedure
that satisfies SCM on the set of indivisible preference profiles. Suppose that
(w, l) is its win-loss index for the profile with the preference digraph shown in
Fig. 4 and that si = h(wi, ℓi), i = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 9 In the above assumptions, (i) ℓ2 = ℓ3; (ii) w2 = w3.
Proof of Lemma 9. First, assume that (w, l) is a win-loss index of kth order.
If k = 0, (i) and (ii) of Lemma 9 hold. Note also that w6 = w7. If k > 0, there
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Fig. 4. Preferences in the proof of Theorem8.
exists a win-loss index (w′, l′) of (k − 1)th order and functions f , g, α and β
such that Eqs (21) hold for i = 1, . . . , 7. In particular,
w6 =
1
α(1,2)
f (〈(1, w′1), (0, w
′
2), . . . , (0, w
′
7)〉) = w7.
(i) Similarly, ℓ2 = ℓ3.
(ii) w2 =
1
α(1,1)
f (〈(0, w′1), . . . , (0, w
′
5), (1, w
′
6), (0, w
′
7)〉),
w3 =
1
α(1,1)
f (〈(0, w′1), . . . , (0, w
′
5), (1, w
′
7), (0, w
′
6)〉).
In the latter formula we interchanged the two last elements of the multiset
W ′3. As we have seen above, for every win-loss index of finite order, w6 = w7,
hence w′6 = w
′
7. Therefore, w2 = w3.
For win-loss indices of infinite order, (i) and (ii) are proved similarly.
Suppose now that (w, l) is an arbitrary win-loss index. Then there exists a
sequence of win-loss indices of finite or infinite order ((w1, ℓ1), (w2, ℓ2), . . .) and
functions ϕ and ψ such that
wi=ϕ(w
1
i , ℓ
1
i , w
2
i , ℓ
2
i , . . .),
ℓi=ψ(w
1
i , ℓ
1
i , w
2
i , ℓ
2
i , . . .), i = 1, . . . , 7.
Since for every t = 1, 2, . . ., ℓt2 = ℓ
t
3 and w
t
2 = w
t
3, we get ℓ2 = ℓ3 and w2 = w3.
Lemma 9 is proved.
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Since s2 = h(w2, ℓ2) and s3 = h(w3, ℓ3), Lemma 9 implies s2 = s3.
Let us contrast alternatives 2 and 3 by self-consistent monotonicity. It follows
that if either s6 > s7 or s7 > s6, then s2 = s3 is impossible. Hence, s6 = s7.
Now, contrasting alternatives 4 and 5, we get s4 > s5.
Finally, contrasting 6 and 7 and using the proved statements s2 = s3 and
s4 > s5 we get s6 > s7, which contradicts s6 = s7 obtained above. Thus, our
assumption is wrong, and self-consistent monotonicity is broken. ✷
Theorem 8 can be explained as follows. All functions in Definitions 3–6 are
arbitrary, we impose no constraints on them. The only non-arbitrariness was
that “wins” and “losses” were treated separately (whereas “draws” influenced
both win-scores and loss-scores). This separation was not complete, because
the expressions (21) and (22) for win-scores wi also contained the total losses
c−i and vice versa; such a cross-dependence extended to win-indices and loss-
indices (23) too. In spite of that, as can be shown, a win of alternative j over
alternative k can affect the win-score of i 6= k only if there exists a directed
path in the preference multidigraph from i to j or from i to k. Similarly, this
win of j over k can affect the loss-score of i 6= j only if there exists a directed
path from j or from k to i. Therefore the ultimate scores are sensitive only
to directed paths of these two kinds. As can be concluded from the proof of
Theorem 8, self-consistent monotonicity implies the sensitivity of the ultimate
scores to the influences that spread not only through directed paths, but also
via paths with altering directions of arrows.
8 Win-Loss Unifying Procedures
In this section we consider two scoring procedures that do not separate wins
and losses in the score equations, treating them uniformly. Another important
difference from the procedures of Section 6 is that here the function combining
the comparison outcomes and the estimates of the opponents (function f in
Eqs (2)) has an additive (instead of productive) form. It is worth noting that
if the score of i is represented through multiplicative terms such as aij sj, then
the influence of sj upon the score of i depends on aij : the greater aij , the
stronger this influence. In the extreme case where aij = 0, sj is not taken into
account at all. An additive form of scores, on the contrary, causes a uniform
influence of sj upon si, regardless of aij . This appears more reasonable.
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8.1 The Least-Squares Procedure
This procedure, first proposed by Smith [45] and Gulliksen [46] and then
investigated in [47–52, etc.], constructs a mean square approximation of the
comparison outcomes by the differences between the desired scores:
minimize
s
∑
i,j,p
(rpij − (si−sj))
2, (24)
where
rpij = a
p
ij − a
p
ji (25)
is a skew-symmetric modification of the comparison outcomes; rpij are unde-
fined whenever apij and a
p
ji are undefined; the sum extends over those i, j and
p for which rpij is definite.
Partial differentiation reduces the problem (24) to the system of linear equa-
tions
si =
1
mi
∑
j,p
(sj +r
p
ij), i = 1, . . . , n, (26)
where mi = c
+
i + c
−
i is the number of comparisons of i.
Note some parallelism of this system of equations and that of (19). A multi-
plicative counterpart of Eqs (26) is considered in [16] and fits (3).
This procedure is applicable not only to indivisible preference profiles, but to
all profiles with connected preference multigraph. Under this condition, the
rank of the system (26) is n − 1, and scores s1, . . . , sn can be found up to
an additive constant. For the complete preferences, this procedure reduces to
that of row sums, and it is rather well-performing for incomplete numerical
(weighted) preferences. However, in the case of discrete incomplete preferences
which we consider here, it can produce some unnatural results (see the proof
of the following proposition).
Proposition 10 The Least squares procedure breaks self-consistent monoto-
nicity.
PROOF. Consider the preference multidigraph shown in Fig. 5.
The least-squares score of 2 is greater than that of 1, in spite of that 1 has an
extra win. This breaks self-consistent monotonicity. ✷
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Fig. 5. Preferences in the proof of Proposition 10.
This proof can be commented as follows. The Least-squares procedure better
fits numerical preferences; it punishes 1 for the win over 4 because it “expects”
that if 1 beats 3 and 3 beats 4 with the same “intensity”, 1 should beat 4 with
a greater intensity. The following procedure eliminates this flaw.
8.2 The Generalized Row Sum Procedure
This procedure [53,54] can be considered as a Bayesian modification of the
previous one. It is derived axiomatically and has Markov chain and graph
theoretic interpretations [55,56]. The scores satisfy the system of equations
si = ε
∑
j,p
(γrpij − (si−sj)), i = 1, . . . , n, (27)
where ε is a positive parameter, ε ≤ (m(n− 2))−1, and γ = mn+ ε−1.
Proposition 11 The Generalized row sum procedure satisfies Self-Consistent
Monotonicity.
The proof is given in [6]. The form of these scores suggests what kind of
procedures satisfies self-consistent monotonicity. A class of such procedures is
described in the following section.
9 A Sufficient Condition of Self-Consistent Monotonicity
Theorem 12 Suppose that a scoring procedure S is such that there exists a
function f defined on finite nonempty multisets of real triples and possessing
of the following properties.
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(i) for every A,
f(〈(apij, si, sj) | j, p〉) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n. (28)
(ii) f is
– increasing in every apij,
– increasing in every sj (j 6= i),
– decreasing in si.
(iii) Let Vi = 〈(a
p
ij, si, sj) | j, p〉. For every A and for every i, k ∈ J ,
if (1, si, sk) ∈ Vi, then f(Vi \ 〈(1, si, sk)〉) < f(Vi);
if (0, si, sk) ∈ Vi, then f(Vi \ 〈(0, si, sk)〉) > f(Vi).
Then scoring procedure S satisfies self-consistent monotonicity.
PROOF. Assume that the relation between i and j described in the state-
ment of self-consistent monotonicity holds, but si < sj (respectively, si ≤ sj
in the strict case). Then, by (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 12, the left-hand side
of the ith equation in the system (28) exceeds the left-hand side of the jth
equation, and hence they both cannot be equal to zero. This contradiction
proves the theorem. ✷
In [57] a modification of SCM is proposed which is met by those and only
those scoring procedures that have the implicit form (i)–(ii) of Theorem 12.
10 Four Procedures Satisfying SCM
Table 1 lists four procedures that satisfy self-consistent monotonicity.
Table 1
Scoring procedures that satisfy SCM.
Procedure Domain∗ f(·) of Theorem 12
Zermelo [58], Bradley&Terry [59],... ID
∑
j,p
(
a
p
ij −
si
si+sj
)
Daniels [11], Ginovker [44] ID
n∑
j=1
(
aij
sj
si
− aji
si
sj
)
Cowden [43] ID
∑
j,p
(aij sj(1− si)− aji si(1− sj))
Generalized row sum procedure [54] U ε
∑
j,p
(γrpij − (si−sj))− si
∗ ID means indivisible preference profiles, U all profiles.
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The second column conveys the set of preference profiles to which the corre-
sponding procedure is applicable. Of the four methods, the Generalized row
sum procedure is based on the solution of a linear system of equations, three
others are reduced to nonlinear systems of equations, which are usually solved
with iterative algorithms.
A question arises of how to compare further the procedures that satisfy self-
consistent monotonicity. The last section contains two remarks on the possible
additional axioms.
11 Concluding Remarks
In a follow-up paper we will continue the axiomatic testing of indirect scoring
procedures and turn to their axiomatic derivation. We now give two possible
conditions which can supplement self-consistent monotonicity.
11.1 Macrovertex Independence
The main idea of self-consistent monotonicity is sensitivity of the aggregating
procedure. However, there exists an independence condition called Macrover-
tex independence that does not contradict SCM and seems rather natural (cf.
the discussion after Theorem 8).
A subsetM of the set of alternatives J is called amacrovertex of the preference
multigraph if for every i, j ∈ M and every k ∈ J \M , nij = njk, where nik is
the number of comparisons between i and k in A.
Macrovertex independence. The comparison outcomes of the alternatives
within a macrovertex have no influence on the scores of the alternatives outside
the macrovertex.
11.2 Splitting Balance
Let us note that self-consistent monotonicity is not a very restrictive condition,
since it leaves room for some preconception. To conclude with what we started,
we address our first example again and give it a sport interpretation. Suppose
that Fig. 1.d depicts an incomplete chess tournament. Assume that 4 is the
world chess champion, 1, 2 and 3 being university students. Our aim is to
estimate the strength of the players taking into account prior information.
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Most probably, the world champion is the strongest player, and we should
allot the highest rank to 4. Player 2 managed to make three draws with the
champion. That is great, and we rank 2 second in spite of three his/her losses
to 1. Then 1 is the third and 3 the last. Note that this rank order does not
contradict SCM! This is what we meant by saying that SCM leaves room for
some preconception. There exists a logic (a bit biased) that justifies ranking
(4, 2, 1, 3). To avoid this, the following condition may be added.
Splitting Balance. Suppose the set of alternatives J can be split into J1 and
J2 such that for no i ∈ J1 and j ∈ J2, aji > 0. Then there exist i ∈ J1 and
j ∈ J2 such that si ≥ sj.
The objective of this paper was to put together various indirect scoring proce-
dures (mainly, of infinite order) and to subject them to the analysis in the spirit
of the social choice theory. We considered the case of incomplete preferences
and an axiom we referred to as self-consistent monotonicity. It was established
that many of the known indirect scoring procedures are win-loss combining
procedures and, by Theorem 8 of Section 7, they break self-consistent mono-
tonicity. In our opinion, some of them are applicable in the analysis of social
networks, since here self-consistent monotonicity is not so attractive as in
preference aggregation (cf. [25,60,61]). For instance, the popularity index of
an individual should not strongly depend on his/her own responses.
In Theorem 12 we proposed a sufficient condition for self-consistent monoto-
nicity and then listed four procedures that satisfy it. The analysis of indirect
scoring procedures started in this paper is intended to be continued with
additional axioms (two possible conditions were mentioned in this section),
and with the end goal of axiomatic construction of such procedures.
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